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COMMENTARY 
w. TAYLOR REVELEY, III * . 
My views have shifted notably as to the proper allocation of power 
between the President and Congress regarding the use of military 
force abroad. Upon leaving college, I was reasonably certain that the 
perils of the times in which we live, and the institutional advantages of 
the President over Congress as a decision-maker, necessitated that he 
make our basic foreign policy decisions, both the peaceful and the war-
like. About all Congress could do was to accept this necessity grace-
fully. While in Law School, I had an opportunity to study the question in 
some detail, and came to the conclusion that though the President had a 
prerogative to initiate policy, and to implement it as he wished, Congress 
might legitimately call him short at any time, and force policies upon him. 
Further study has suggested that Congress is constitutionally entitled 
to an even greater role in the determination of American foreign policy, 
particularly when it involves the use of armed force.• 
Now obviously, as Mr. Belman pointed out, Congress cannot be 
involved in the day-to-day execution of our various external policies. 
But it can have a positive influence on the policies which the executive 
branch implements. The appropriate Congressional role includes-but 
goes beyond-a voice in the decisions which actually rlispatch or with-
hold the troops. A say in these decisions alone would generally give the 
legislators little real influence on the course of events. When the Pres-
ident finally uses force as an ultimate instrument of diplomacy, he most 
often does so out of desperation, under pressures which would bear 
equally on Congressmen. Therefore, if the Congressmen are to have an 
effective role in determining when we will and when we will not use the 
military, they must have a prior voice in shaping the foreign policy which 
forms the context of later decisions. 
Greater congressional influence would not necessarily reduce the num-
ber of wars. The President, on the whole, makes wiser foreign policy 
decisions than Congress; he is institutionally better able to do so. Further, 
there is no reason to think that Congress is fundamentally more 
pacific than the President. One recent notable instance in which the 
militancy of the legislators exceeded that of the Executive occurred 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis; some Congressional leaders would 
have preferred to bomb rather than blockade. On the other hand, it 
is probably true that greater congressional participation would not in-
volve us in more wars. Whereas it is relatively easy for the President to 
use the military despite a reluctant Congress, it would be very diffi-
cult for Congress, in turn, to force a reluctant Executive to take military 
action of which he disapproves, as President Kennedy demonstrated 
during the Missile Crisis. Some restraint would be inherent in the 
• A.B., Princeton University, 1965; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1968. 
1. See generally Reveley, Presidential Warmaking: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpa-
tion?, 55 VA. L. REv. 1243 (1969). 
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process of consultation and deliberation that would emerge were Con-
gress, as well as the President, to have a substantive \'Oice in shaping 
American foreign policy. 
Perhaps the greatest merit in the establishment of a larger role for 
Congress, however, is the constitutional legitimacy it would bestow up-
on the use of force. Most Americans (those, in any event, who have an 
opinion on the matter) think that the Constitution gives legislators a 
strong voice in decisions about American entry into war. Accord-
ingly, when Congress has no meaningful say in the initiation of a conflict, 
two regrettable consequences result. First, the American involvement 
lacks much of the political backing essential to its continuance if 
the fighting proves to be longlasting. The way is open domestically to 
internecine struggle over the merits of American participation-a struggle 
likely to force withdrawal too soon to realize the goals of the hawks and 
too late to effect those of the doves. 
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, the rule of law within this 
country is measurably discredited when the President acts, or appears 
to act, iri an unconstitutional manner. His willingness to initiate hostil-
ities without the prior and express approval of Congress conflicts directly 
with popular notions that the Constitution necessitates such approval. 
The viability of our governmental system depends largely upon volun-
tary obedience to the law. The President and Congress-he through his 
willingness to act unilaterally and the legislators through their willing-
ness to be bypassed-have set a very poor example; their relaxed approach 
to the pertinent dictates of the Constitution is particularly invidious 
in a time when voluntary obedience to the law is under serious challenge 
on a number of fronts. 
Even the strongest supporters of presidential hegemony over Amer-
ican foreign policy would probably agree that greater congres-
sional participation in the shaping of foreign policy would have 
certain advantages; but they argue that the potential costs of such 
participation would be greater. Today, the need for quick, flexible, 
expert, informed, and frequently secret decision-making is highly re-
garded; Congress as an institution is said to be at best inefficient 
and at worst dangerous as an active participant in the decision-mak-
ing which shapes American foreign policy. But it seems that with a few 
changes in its procedures and with a major reformation in its will-
power, Congress could adjust its decision-making processes to meet the 
demands of the times. Moreover, there is question as to what extent 
secrecy and expertise are crucial to the decisions in question. With the 
possible exception of Korea, Cold War crises have not required so hasty 
a commitment of American troops abroad as to preclude congr£'ssional 
participation in the decision to dispatch them. Similarly, with the 
possible exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the initial plannin~ of 
the American response need not have taken place in such strict se-
crecy as to preclude congressional participation. And while expertise 
is helpful in identification of possible courses of action and the likely 
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possible courses of action and the likel~· consequences of each, it is not 
particularly helpful in making the inherently political value 
judgements as to whether or not the objective in question is worth the 
price of war. 
Even should these institutional arguments against a greater 
Congressional role be overcome, supporters of presidential control 
may still question the legislators' competence on another score: Their 
judgment. There exists a fear, stemming in good part from ill-advised 
congressional policies during the years between the two World Wars, 
that the legislators would make decisions detrimental to national 
security. No doubt that danger exists, though it is imP,ortant to 
remember that fallibility does not grace solely the legislative branch. 
Moreover, if any branch of government persists in making decisions 
unresponsive to the needs of the times, it will find its authority 
circumvented, as was the case with Congress at the hands of Franklin 
Roosevelt during the late 1930's. The likelihood of such legislative 
myopia today, however, is not great. 
I have suggested the existence of widespread expectations that when 
the United States has a choice whether or not to go to war-that is, 
when hostilities are not thrust upon us by an attack directly 
threatening American territorial integrity-Congress must approve 
our involvement, or the Constitution will be violated. These 
expectations are well-founded. Admittedly when you look at the 
relevant constitutional provisions in Articles I and II, the language is 
ambiguous: Terms susceptible of many meanings are often used: 
conflicting grants of power are made to the President and Congress. 
Ambiguity admitted, however, the fact remains that in terms of ex-
pre~s grants of power over the shaping of foreign policy, especially 
belligerent foreign policy Congress emerges well ahead of the President. 
The intent of the Framers confirms the indication inherent in the 
Constitution's language that Congress is to have a meaningful voice in 
thE> determination of foreign policy. It seems clear that the Framers 
intended that both houses of Congress, with presidential advice, no 
doubt, and subject to executive approval or veto, to decide whether the 
goals sought are worth the likely consequences of resort to military 
force. By so involving Congress and the President, the Framers hoped 
to avoid both hasty, ill-conceived wars and wars devoid of the requisite 
national backing. Precedent during the early years of the Republic-a 
time when many of the Framers· were still active in public 
affairs--suggests that their definition of war was extremely broad, 
including very limited conflicts which involved no formal declaration 
of war (such as the Naval War with France of 1798-1800), as well as 
more comprehensive, formally proclaimed struggles (for example, the 
Warof1812). 
The meaning to be given the language in the Constitution is not 
confined to the intent of the Framers when they wrote the document or 
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when they gave content to its provisions by their own conduct in the 
new government. To remain functional the Constitution has, and 
must, evolve to meet the changing needs of the country. When, 
however, the Framers' language and intent seem clearly to compel a 
certain political process, when that process is not adverse to the needs 
of the times, and when strong popular belief exists that the process is 
constitutionally required, then it should be honored. Applying these 
criteria to Articles I and II, I find they grant Congress a larger role in 
decisions to commit American troops abroad than it has exercised dur-
ing the last twenty-five years. 
What of the argument that significant congressional involvement is 
no longer required, at least as a matter of Constitutional law, because 
the Consitution has been amended by usage to permit unilateral 
presidential war-making? Unquestionably presidential practice before 
the Second World War and during the Cold War provides precedent 
for a wide-ranging executive writ. And unquestionably, this practice has 
bred expectations that the President is constitutionally entitled to act 
broadly to defend the country. 
But these expectations have not displaced in most people's thinking 
the more longstanding view that the President should seek Congres-
sional counsel and approval before initiating hostilities abroad. There 
is ample precedent prior to the Cold War supporting this conclusion. 
With the exception of President Polk's fait accompli in the Mexican War 
(a bit of presidential warmaking which th~ House of Representatives cen-
sured as unconstitutional by a close. vote in 1848),2 there was in general 
collaboration during the nineteenth ce~tury between the President and 
Congress regarding the use of force abroad. Virtually all Executives of this 
period felt constitutionally bound to seek congressional approval before 
initiating hostilities. During the first forty years of the twentieth century, 
congressional influence over American foreign policy remained strong, 
as in the Neutrality Acts of the 1930's.3 Unfortunately the pernicious 
nature of much of that influence forced the more far-sighted Presidents 
of the era, Franklin Roosevelt in particular, to circumvent the legislators 
by fair means or foul. 
As to the unilateral Presidential acts of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, most of them have little or no relevance to the 
present situation. The Presidents acting in those instances acted 
under circumstances wholly unlike those of today; accordingly, their 
conduct cannot be used to justify the activities of contemporary 
Executives. In any event the bulk of the incidents cited, especially 
those of the nineteenth century, were so minute in effort and impact as 
to pose no threat to congressional war powers. This, admittedly, was 
not the case with many instances of unilateral intervention by the 
2. CoNG. Gt.oiE, 30th Cong. 1st Sess. 95 (1848), cited in Reveley, supra 1, at 
1260 n.48. 
3. Ch. 837, 49 Stat. 1081 (1935); ch. 146, 50 Stat. 121 (1937); ch. 2, 54 Stat. 4 (1939). 
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President in Latin states during the first three decades of the 
twentieth century. 
But even such presidential war-making took place under 
circumstances in which it was relatively easy to predict the 
consequences of the use of force, and in which the risk of escalation 
was largely non-existent. Moreover the incidents in question, 
particularly during the nineteenth century, occurred in an era when 
the United States had made no commitments to defend some states 
and to contain others. Thus it was virtually impossible for a Presi-
dent to present Congress with a situation in which it felt compelled 
to support his action, Jest the credibility of our commitments be 
doubted and our defense posture weakened. In any event, had a nine-
teenth, and to some extent an early twentieth, century President 
wished to embark upon significant military efforts abroad without 
Congressional approval, he would have been hard-pressed to do so, 
as the standing military establishment was modest in the extreme. To 
raise the requisite troops, he would have had to seek congressional 
authorization. Finally, even when the incidents in question did not 
involve such minutia as the· pursuit of pirates or small naval landings 
to protect American citizens or property from mob violence, they 
consisted principally of interferences with the affairs of backward, 
powerless states during an era which predated Article II of the U.N. 
Charter. 
Against this background, let me speak briefly on what I think the 
President can do unilaterally. First, it seems clear that he is duty-
bound to respond immediately when United States territory is phys-
ically attacked, or is in imminent danger of attack. In such a situa-
tion, the decision whether or not the United States will fight has been 
made by the attacking power. Conflict has been thrust upon us, and to 
this extent congressional authorization of hostilities becomes super-
fluous. The President's response, however, should be proportionate 
to the attack. Once he has utterly repelled it, he should not then him-
self, without congressional authorization, go on the offensive. For exam-
ple, if enemy submarines were to shell with conventional ordinance a few 
coastal cities, the President would not have discretion to unleash SAC 
against the homeland of the attacking boats. But he would be free to sink 
or capture all hostile vessels caught within striking distance of American 
cities. 
What of attacks on American security interests which do not involve 
physical assault on United States territory? In these situations the 
President is obligated to seek congressional authorization-if at all 
possible-before he acts. It is true that American security interests are 
worldwide now and that an attack need not be upon our territory to 
threaten directly our national security. On the other hand, reasonable 
men may disagree as to which foreign security interests are worth 
fighting for, and to what extent we should commit our forces. 
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Accordingly, as was the Framers' design, it is imperative that both 
houses of Congress be involved in the decision to fight, lest the war be 
hasty or ill-coneeived or lest it lack adequate political support. The 
fact that a conflict is condoned by an international organization, as 
was the Korean War, does not obviate the necessity for Congressional 
approvaL The Korean conflict is the premier instance of unconsti-
tutional executive war-making. 
Should the President be faced with a sudden attack on an ally which 
he feels must be repelled immediately, and should he believe that 
Congress would willingly support American intervention, he is 
constitutionally permitted to respond unilaterally, while at the same 
time placing the matter before Congress and asking for ratification of 
the action taken and for approval of further use of force. Or should the 
President believe that the American response to an attack upon one of 
our external security interests must be prepared in the greatest 
secrecy and sprung suddenly upon the enemy if it is to be effective, 
then he is entitled again to act first and seek congressional approval 
after the fact. Admittedly in both situations he would present C.onJ!TPSs 
with a fait accompl~ but his institutional advantages over Congress as 
a quick, flexible, informed, and if necessary secret decision-maker, 
and the nature of the times, neeessitate that Congress gracefully 
accept this limitation on its powers. Presumably the legislators would 
not be reluctant to do so if they had a meaningful role in the shaping of 
American foreign policy and if they felt certain that the President 
would not act unilaterally unless he felt it essential, and unless he 
believed that Congress would willingly approve the measures taken. 
What of attacks on American civilians or troops abroad? Obviously 
any Americans assaulted while outside the United States are 
permitted to defend themselves to the best of their ability. If they are in 
international air space or waters, it seems that the President can 
unilaterally do all in his power to defend them, just as he can repel 
assaults on American territory. But if the Americans are attacked 
within the territory of another state, the President should not send 
forces to their aid if the step risks significant hostilities. For example, 
the President could have done anything within his power to rescue the 
Pueblo before the North Korean:, forced it into port. But once its 
capture had been consummated, any attempt by the President to 
recover the ship or its crew, or to retaliate against the attackers, 
would have risked sizable hostilities with the North Koreans, and 
therefore should not have been undertaken without congressional 
approval. On the other hand, the joint 1965 effort by American and 
Belgian forces to rescue whites under attack in the Congo by clements 
beyond the control of the central government could be undertaken 
unilaterally by the Executive without constitutional difficulty. Hostil-
ities with another state were not involved, and there was no risk of large-
scale fighting. Needless to say, the speed and secrecy exceptions to 
the necessity for prior congressional approval apply in this contP"'t as 
well. 
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As far as the peacetime deployment of American armed forces is con-
cerned, the President has a broad prerogative to locate the troops as he 
sees fit, so long as he does not thereby immediately precipitate hos-
tilities. Presumably, however, the deployment will be in accord with basic 
foreign policy objectives, which will have already been formulated with 
the assistance and approval of Congress. 
Let me make one final remark, which was implicit in several of my 
earlier comments. To authorize the use of force abroad, I certainly do 
not believe it necessary that Congress formally declare war. Any type 
of affirmative indication by both houses that they approve the hos-
tilities will suffice, though a joint resolution may be the best method 
as it avoids the dangers inherent in a formal declaration, and yet still 
speaks directly and singly to the question of the use of force. This res-
olution should be adopted only after Congress has adequately consid-
ered the situation and the proposed measure and its legislative history 
should clearly indicate, at the least, the steps authorized and their ob-
jectives. 
